



Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies? Consumption and Connection Subsidies in Africa

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Tariffs & Subsidies - Context

- Large subsidies for electricity and water in developing countries (tariffs below cost)
- Use of Inverted Block Tariffs for protecting small customers (ex.: lower tariff/kwh for consumption below 40kwh per month, higher tariff/kwh for additional consumption above 40kwh, etc.)
- Alternative to IBTs is VDT
- Alternative to consumption subsidies is subsidies for network expansion
- Which subsidies are well targeted?



Targeting/benefit incidence measure

- Parameter Ω = share of subsidies in tariff structure received by the poor divided by share of poor in population
- Example: if poverty is at 62% in Rwanda, and the poor get 6% of a subsidy, $\Omega=0.1$
- Objective: Ω as large as possible (if $\Omega > 1$, subsidies considered as pro-poor)



Analytical framework

- Five determinants of Ω
- A = access to electricity in neighborhood
- U = take-up of electricity given access
→ $A * U = \text{actual household access rate}$
- T = share of households with subsidy
- R = rate of subsidization
- Q = quantity of electricity consumed
- C = average cost of production & distribution
→ $R * Q * C = \text{subsidy value among beneficiaries}$



Analytical framework

- Average benefit among the poor

$$B_p = A_p * U_p * T_p * R_p * Q_p * C$$

- Average benefit among population

$$B_n = A_n * U_n * T_n * R_n * Q_n * C$$

$$\Omega = \left(\frac{A_P}{A_N} \right) \left(\frac{U_P}{U_N} \right) \left(\frac{T_P}{T_N} \right) \left(\frac{R_P}{R_N} \right) \left(\frac{Q_P}{Q_N} \right)$$




Example – Burkina Faso


- National, electricity

- $A_p=0.09, A_n=0.22 \rightarrow A \text{ ratio} = 0.40$
- $U_p=0.09, U_n=0.43 \rightarrow U \text{ ratio} = 0.21$
- $T_p=1.00, T_n=1.00 \rightarrow T \text{ ratio} = 1.00$
- $R_p=0.46, R_n=0.35 \rightarrow R \text{ ratio} = 1.32$
- $Q_p=21.4, Q_n=36.7 \rightarrow Q \text{ ratio} = 0.58$
 - $\rightarrow \Omega = 0.06$
 - $\rightarrow \gamma < 0.03$


Cross-country data: Ω for electricity




Cross-country data: Ω for water



Cross-country data: Access vs. subsidy design factors - Electricity



Cross-country data: Access vs. subsidy design factors - Water







Connection subsidies: simulations

- 1st scenario: Distribution of connection subsidies mirrors distribution of existing connection (least favorable)
- 2nd scenario: Households with access in neighborhood and no connection get subsidy
- 3rd scenario: Connection subsidy randomly allocated to households without connection, even if access in neighborhood is not there (most favorable long term scenario)

Cross-country data: Potential targeting of connection subsidies - Electricity



Cross-country data: Potential targeting of connection subsidies - Water





(Counter-intuitive) Argument in favor of raising utility tariffs for poverty reduction

- Utility consumption subsidies through tariffs are badly targeted vs. other subsidies (educ./health/social prot.)
 - Coverage of networks is low, esp. in poor countries
 - Impact on poverty of higher tariffs is relatively low because coverage is low and not for the poor
 - Utilities losing money cannot expand networks
 - Gain from access to network for the poor is much larger than gain from consumption subsidies (2 reasons: externalities & unit costs - Niger example)
 - Despite affordability concerns, willingness to pay studies suggest non-connected households would rather pay higher tariffs and get access
- Increasing tariffs and using proceeds for investments in capacity and network expansion is probably pro-poor



How to raise tariffs/reduce subsidies in sensible way?

- Lower threshold for “lifeline” bracket in tariff structure (examples: 20kWh, 4-6m³)
- VDT is a useful alternative to IBT - large savings in cost of subsidies (but discontinuity)
- Control of pricing at public fountains (Niger)
- Better cost recovery for pirate connections
- Evaluation of targeting of connection subsidies: many may still not be reaching the poor properly
- Reduction in cost structure and improvement in efficiency & management of utilities